BOOK REVIEWS.

BOOK REVIEWS.
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Press, Philadelphia, 1892.

The writer of this monograph takes the ground that the
extent of the constitutional power of Congress to regulate
commerce among the several States can only be determined
by an examination of the decisions of the Supreme Court
of the United States interpreting the commerce clause of
the Constitution; and the book itself is an excellent though
compendious review of those decisions, particularly so far
as they define the word "commerce," the nature of the
Federal power over it, the effect of the commerce clause
upon the general legislative power of the States, their right
of taxation, and their police power. Each branch of the
general subject is considered historically, and the whole is
followed by a most convenient index of decisions, in which
the cases are classified according to their different subjects.
The commerce clause of the Constitution has perhaps
given rise to more litigation than any other, except that
defining the judicial power of the Federal Government,
and that inhibiting States from passing laws impairing the
obligation of contracts. While the general limits of this
power may be regarded as conclusively settled, there is
still much uncertainty with respect to the authority of the
States over commerce not .wholly internal, particularly in
respect to their police power, and their power to tax tte
subjects of interstate commerce. Even since this .book was
published, and during the term which has just closed, several important cases have been decided, which ar6 claimed
by some to qualify to a certain extent the principles laid
down in prior cases. Thus in Maine v. Grand Trunk
Railway Co., 142 U. S., 217, it was held, though by a bare
majority of the Court, that a State statute requiring every
railroad within the State to pay an annual tax for its franchise, to be determined by the amount of its gross transportation receipts; and further providing that, when ap-
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plied to a railroad'lying partly within and partly without
the State, the tax shall be equal to the proportion of the
gross receipts in the State, did not conflict with the Constitution of the United States. In this case Mr. Justice
BRADLEY made his last public utterance from the bench in a
strong dissent, concurred in by three other Justices, taking
the position that the laying of a tax upon the gross receipts
of a company, including receipts for interstate and international transportation, was substantially a taxation of the
revenues derived from interstate commerce, which had
been held in many previous decisions to be unconstitutional; citing Philadelphia Steamship Co. v. Pennsylvania, 112 U. S., 326, and several other cases. The majority of the Court, however, was of the opinion that this
was an excise tax upon the corporation for the privilege
of exercising its franchises within the State, and that the
rule of apportioning the charge to the receipts was reasonable, and likely to produce the most satisfactory results
both to the State and the corporation taxed. A distinction
was drawn, which to ihe minority of the Court seemed to be
unsound, between a levy upon the receipts themselves, and
a reference to them simply as a means of ascertaining the
value of the privilege conferred.
In the Horn Silver Mining Co. v. New York, 143 U.
S., 305, it was held, Mr. Justice HARLAN alone dissenting,
that a statute of New York imposing a tax upon the corporate franchise or business of every corporation organized
under a law of any other State, to be computed by a percentage upon its whole capital stock, was not an unconstitutional interference with interstate commerce, when applied to a manufacturing corporation organized under the
laws of Utah, and doing a greater part of its business out
of the State of New York, but doing a small part of its
business within such State.
The principle involved in the case of Munn v. Illinois,
94 U. S., 113, which has given rise to so much controversy,
was carefully reconsidered and adhered to in the case of
Budd v. New York, 143 U. S., 517, although in this case,
as in the Munn case, there was a dissent by three of the
Justices.
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In Ficklen v. The Taxing District, unreported, a
statute of Tennessee, imposing upon brokers a tax measured
by the amount of capital invested or used in their business,
was held to be proper, although the business done by the
broker in question was in the purchase of cotton for customers residing outside of the State. The gist of the
decision was, that as the State has the right to tax occupations, where a resident citizen engaged in such business,
the fact that the business done chanced to consist wholly
or partly in negotiating sales between resident aitd nonresident merchants, did not necessarily make the tax' one
upon interstate commerce.

The case was distinguished

from Robbins v. Shelby County Taxing District, i2o U.,
S., 489, in the fact that the tax in that case was imposed
upon drummers and all persons not having a regular
licensed house of business in the district, and. it was held
as against non-resident drummers to be an unlawful interference with interstate commerce.
In the Lehigh Valley R. R. Co. v. Pennsylvania, a tax
upon receipts for transportation between places in Pennsylvania, over lines partly in Pennsylvania and partly in another State, that is to say, passing out of Pennsylvania
into other States, and back agiin into Pennsylvania in
course of transportation, was lawful. In this case the
Lehigh Valley Company operated a line from Mauch
Chunk to Philadelphia, by the way of a line entering New
Jersey at Phillipsburg, and running thence by way of
Trenton to Philadelphia. This was held to be internal commerce only, and the fact that a part of a continuous transportation was performed outside of the State did not affect
the character of the traffic.
Finally, in the Interstate Commerce Commission v.
B. & 0. R. R. Co., the Supreme Court entered, for the first
time, upon the consideration of the Interstate Commerce
law, a statute which is likely to be fruitful of litigation, and
held that the practice of issuing a single ticket for the
transportation of ten or more persons at a reduced rate
from the ordinary passenger fare was not an "unjust discrimination" or "an undue or unreasonable preference,"
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within the meaning of Sections 2 and 3 of the Interstate
Commerce law, and was, therefore, legal. This practice
originated with the issuing of tickets to the managers of
theatrical and operatic companies for the transportation of
their entire troupes, and has become general throughout the
country. The decision was strictly within the line bf the
construction given to the English traffic acts by the courts
of the United Kingdom, and the Court carefully excluded
the question of discrimination as applied to the transportatioitof freight. Curiously enough, this decision:is seized
uipon by a portion of the newspaper press as indicating the
hostility of the Court to the Interstate Commerce law, when
nothing could be further from this than the language of the
opinion.
The difficulties surrounding the interpretation of the
commerce clause of the Constitution are apparent, not only
from the number of decided cases, and the multiplicity of
questions dependent upon this clause, but from the fact.
that the members of the Court itself have never been, and
in the nature of things probably never will be, entirely
harmonious in their views. Rarely has an important case,
involving the construction of this clause, been decided without a dissent from one or more members of the Court, and
the most that can be hoped for is the determination of each
question as it arises, and the gradual settlement of principles as they can be extracted from these cases.
The book of Mr. LEwIs contains an accurate statement
of these principles so far as they can be considered settled
by the adjudications of this tribunal.-H. B. BROWN.

CORPORATIONS

IN

PENNSYLVANIA.

By WALTER MURPHY, author of

"PARTNERSHIPS, ETC., IN PENNSYLVANIA."

delphia, x89i.

Twovolumes.

Phila-

Rees Welsh and Company.

In these two volumes Mr. MURPHY presents to the profession a digest of Pennsylvania decisions on the law of
corporations, as well by County Courts as by the Supreme
Court of the State. The work includes an elaborate index,
which is in itself a digest, for it includes under the appro-
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priate headings a summary of the matter set forth at greater
length in the text. One of the most valuable features of
this index is the chronological list of Acts of Assembly from
1713 to 189o, the date of each act serving as a caption of a

paragraph of a summarized decision in construction of the
statute. In his preface the author expresses the hope that
his work mav be useful. There is no doubt that this hope
will be realized; with Mr. MuRPHY's digest in hand the

lawyer will have little difficulty in finding what the courtshave said on a given point. The system of references and
cross-references is reasonably good, and the division of
topics is on the whole satisfactory. What we call "Corporation Law" is as yet a heterogeneous mass, and it would
be unfair to criticise the maker of a digest on the ground
that his classification is not always logical. There is in this
work perhaps too strong a tendency to place implicit reliance in the syllabus of our reported cases as a faithful exponent of the decisions. An examination reveals a few
instances in which the opinion of the Court in a digested
case does not fully sustain the reporter's syllabus.
On the whole the digest is a good one. It is convenient
in size and the general "make-up" of the book is excellent.
But the -book is only a digest; we cannot assent to the
author's statement that it "possesses all the qualities appertaining to a treatise or text-book on the subject of corporations." It contains the materials for a treatise, but then,
too, the census tables contain materials for an essay on
G. W. P.
population.
LEADING CASES SIMPLIFIED. A CoLLEcTIoN
OF COMMON LAW, LEADING CASES IN
TIONAL LAW, AND LEADING CASES ON
By PROFESSOR JOHN
volumes in one.
Whitney Company, San Francisco, 1892.

OF THE LEADING CASES
EQUITY AND CONSTITUCRIMINAL LAW. Three
D. LAWSON.
Bancroft,

This is not a new edition of Professor LAWSON'S book.
The three volumes in which the work originally appeared
are now bound together and sold as one volume. This
renders the whole more convenient to handle and, we presume, effects a reduction in the price. The change in form,
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if not in substance, renders it fitting that something should
be said concerning the work itself. In his preface to the
first volume the author sets forth his objects as follows:
"In this little book I have aimed at these results: (I) To
give the student a collection of the acknovledged leading
cases on the common law." (Subsequently the author has
added Equity, Constitutional and Criminal Law.) (2) "To
present these in a style which shall arrest his attention and
render it possible for him to acquire their principles readily,
and fix those principles in his mind unincumbered by unimportant and sometimes unintelligible facts."
Of the last object it may be said that no praise is too
high for the many merits-there are few defects-of Prof.
LAwsoN's style. Though the cases are presented in as humorous a light as possible, to use the author's own words,
!'humor has never been indulged in at the expense of
truth."
Since the publication of the "Comic Blackstone," the:
idea that the dry statements of law can be presented to the
student coated with the sugar of absurdity, is very prevalent, and Mr. LAwsoN's book is partly a justification for it..
He has shown that many cases can be made funny without
sacrificing either the statement of the facts or the principlesof law. Of course all discussion of the merits and defects
of a principle is necessarily eliminated. But his reports.
also prove that the facts of many cases are invariably dry..
It is seldom that the (humorous?) report of any case on constitutional law will raise a smile on the most risible. In
those cases which are really funny the humor will be appreciated much more by a lawyer, who thorofighly knows the
cases, and therefore requires no effort to grasp the principles,
than by a layman, who reads for the purpose of self-improvement. In fact, one may venture to predict that the value
of the work is chiefly as an aid to one desiring to review,
and fix in his mind, the principles of the law originally
learned in the lecture-room, through text-books, or from
the-reports. For this purpose, it is well worth reading, not
only by the student who desires to prepare for an examination, but by the lawyer who wants to refresh his memory
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in the easiest and pleasantest way, of those cases which
best illustrate the principles of law.
Prof. LAWSON has published the Six Carpenters Case
and other reports in rhyme by the "Apprentice of Lincoln's
Inn." This fact alone would render the book well worth
owning.
Concerning the author's first object, it may be said that
there are two ways in which a student can obtain a knowledge of the principles of law: Through a direct examination of the principles themselves as stated in the textbooks, or through a review of the reports of cases which
illustrate those principles. A mixture of these two ways
is the method which has been adopted by most compilers
of " Leading Cases." A case is given, and then the principle, together with its modifications, is discussed. Concerning the merits of the system nothing need here be said..
Minds are not all cast in the same mould. To many the
notes on Smith's "Leading Cases" have proved a mine of
information, to others a hopeless .labyrinth of confused
knowledge. Prof. LAWSON has adopted a radically different
principle in his "Leading Cases.".
The reader will not only find the fifty or sixty cases
which are ordinarily spoken of as leading, simply because
they, or the notes which commentators have written to
them, are constantly referred to in the opinions of the
courts, but some two hundred and fifty additional and carefully selected cases. In fact, many of the cases reported,
especially from the American courts, can hardly be called
leading, in the sense that they are widely known by the
profession. This, however, does not detract from the
merits of the work, which is rather a collection of
cases in illustration of the leading principles of law, than
simply a collection of acknowledged leading cases. The
large number of cases enables the compiler not only to illustrate a principle, but often to show its leading modifications without resorting to notes. Thus, in illustrating the
law of contracts we have, .under. the head of "Consideration," not only the rule that. forbearance to sue is a sufficient consideration, shown by the case of Hockenbery v.
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Meyers,' but the modification that there must be a legal
cause of action is illustrated by the report of Palfrey v.
Portland R. R. Co.' In several instances two or three
cases illustrating the same rule are given. Thus, under
the head of "Contracts by Post," are reported Adams v.
Lindsell,' Taylor v. Merchants' Fire Ins. Co.,' and Household Fire Ins. Co. v. Grant.'
Though there is only one note in the report of sixty
odd -cases on contracts, one who fixes these cases in his
mind will have a very fair idea of the subject. The whole
affords, we believe, a much clearer view of the law than
could possibly be gained from reading elaborate notes to a
smaller number of reported cases.
But all branches of the law are not capable of such
simple illustration. The cases illustrating the judicial
ifiterpretation of the Statute of Frauds, for instance, give
one but an inadequate idea of the confusion of thought
which has resulted from the attempt to construe what ought
to have been made a part of the law of evidence, as a codification of the substantive law of contracts.
In reporting equity cases, Prof. LAWSON seems to have
given up the attempt to give, through the reports of decisions, an adequate outline of the law. Thus, in the very
commencement, under the head of Uses and Trusts, in the
attempted report of Tyrrel's case' he says: "The facts
need not be given here, for it is sufficient for the student
to remember only the important principle it decides.
. . . There cannot be a use upon a use." Then follows a note on the Statute of Uses and the doctrine of
Trusts. In the same way, it has been found necessary to
add a note to almost every equity case in order to give the
reader any conception of the law at all. It may be said
that the value of the work falls in proportion to the
increase in the number of the notes. More cases and less
notes would have been advisable.
Dealing with Constitutional law, Prof. LAWSON seems
134 N.J. L., 346.

3 Barn & Ald., 68r.
5 4 Ex. Div., 216.

24 Allen, 55.
4 9 How., 390.
6 Dyer, 155 a.
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to find the same difficulty of illustrating the law as it exists
to-day through concise reports of cases. It may be suggested that one of the principal reasons for this is the fact
that in this branch the same care in selection of cases, which,
with accuracy, conciseness and clearness of statement, is
the chief merit of the rest of the work, has not been displayed. Constitutional law has undergone so many modifications of late years, that many cases, once justly called
leading, no longer illustrate the present position of* the
Court.
From the fact that the report of the case of New York
v. Miln 1 and the report of the License Cases' are both
retained, it is evident that the work has not been revised
since 1882, when the last volume was published. Such
a revision would have eliminated these two cases, as it is
extremely doubtful whether the former expresses the law
as it exists to-day, and the latter has been expressly overruled.' The logical arrangement of the subject, however,
largely redeems this part of the work from these serious
defects.
w. D. L.
A TREATISE ON THE LAvS OF INSURANCk;

FIRE, LIFE, ACCIDENT,
MARINE; WITH A SELECTION o LEADING ILLUSTRATIVE CASES,
AND AN APPENDIX o STATUTES AND FORMS. By GEORGE RICH-

ARDS, OF THE NEW YORK BAR, AND LECTURER ON INSURANCE
LAW IN THE SCHOOL o LAW OF COLUMBIA COLLEGE.
and Albany: Banks & Brothers, 1892.

New York

This is a book of peculiar interest and importance.
It is an admirable work to put into the hands of students,
for whose use it is primarily designed. It will also be of
service to the profession, as well on account of its clear
statement of important principles, as by reason of its satisfactory discussion of the law applicable to standard fire and
other policies now in common use. It may, therefore, justly
be called an important book, and it is an unusually inter-

esting book, because it represents " the result of an effort
to combine the advantages of the two more prominent
I II Pet., 1o2.
25 How., 5o4.
3

Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U. S., IOO.
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methods in use for teaching law, commonly known as. the
text-book and case systems, the comparative merits of which
have recently aroused widespread and thoughtful attention." Such is the author's own statement in the opening
lines of his exceptionally thoughtful and well-reasoned preface.

Mr. RICHARDS contrasts the treatise or text-book

system of instruction with the case-book system, characterizing them as follows : "The former method is more synthetic and abstract, the latter more inductive and concrete.
The former is more theoretical, and, in a sense, more scientific; the latter, while embracing a narrower range of decisions, is, with respect to the particular adjudications and
principles which it includes, more definite, practical and
thorough." Believing that each of these methods "possesses points of superiority over the other," Mr. RICHARDS
has endeavored in this work to combine the advantages of
both systems, with the hope, as we suppose, that as a
result of the combination the disadvantages of both will
be eliminated. Accordingly, the second part of the book
consists of a reprint from the original report of leading cases
illustrative of the principles discussed. These cases, between fifty and sixty in number, are carefully selected and
are grouped under chapter headings corresponding with
those in the first part of the work. When these cases are
read in connection with the chapters to which they correspond, the advantages of Mr. RICHARDS' method of combination become evident. The dangers and disadvantages of the
text-book system are, to a great extent, avoided, while the
greatest objection urged against the case system, that the
student is induced "to pin his faith to isolated decisions,"
is altogether overcome.
On the other hand, the combination method, as exhibited in this book, does not do full justice to thecase system.
It is impossible, in the nature of things, that the most
characteristic advantages of that system should be here exhibited. The reader does not see the law grow before his
very eyes as he does when he peruses a larger volume of
well-selected cases arranged in chronological order. He
cannot, under the combination method any more than un-
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der the text-book system, study the fiast of the law in the
way in which he is compelled to study its firesent. We
have no option as to the way in which we shall keep pace
with the present development of legal principles ; we must
read such cases as we deem important as fast as they are
decided-day after day-year after year. It is, indeed, true
that we cannot say with certainty of a given case, "This
decision will be law a century hence "-while we can assert,
without hesitation, of many a case a century old that it is
not law to-day. But the accuracy of our judgment respecting a new decision will approach certainty if our legal
knowledge has, so to speak, "grown up with the law "if by watching the development and evolution of principles
we have become imbued with the genius of the law. By
means of -the case system we become familiar with the
methods by which results are reached as well as with the
results themselves. We can not only survey the completed
structure, but we can mark the progress of the work
and scrutinize the process of fitting stone to stone; and it is
to be observed that the stones which the builders have refused possess an educational value as well as those which
have been accepted ; so that overruled cases are only less
instructive than those which represent the law to-day.
The advocate of the text-book system, and even Mr.
RICHARDS himself, might reply to these observations in the
language of a very eminent English judge of our own day.
In the introduction to his Digest of the Law of Evidence,
SIR JAMES FITZJAMES STEPH-EN uses the following language:
"LORD COKE wrote, 'It is ever good to rely upon the
books at large; for many times Compendia sunt disfiendia,
and Melius est fietere fonles quam sectari rivulos.' Mr.
SMITH chose this expression as the motto of his ' Leading
Cases,' and the sentiment which it embodies has exercised
immense influence over our law. It has not, perhaps, been
sufficiently observed that when COKE wrote, the 'books at
large', namely the 'Year Books' and a very few more
modern reports, contained probably about as much matter
as two, or at most three, years of the reports published by
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the Council of Law Reporting; and that the com/.endia (such
books, say, as Fitzherbert's 'Abridgment') were merely
abridgments of the cases in the 'Year Books' classified in
the roughest possible manner, and much inferior both in
extent and arrangement to such a book as Fisher's 'Digest.'
In our own days it appears to me that the true fontes are
not to be found in reported cases, but in the rules and principles which such cases imply, and that the cases themselves are the rivuli,the following of which is a disoendium.
My attempt in this work has been emphatically fletere
fontes, to reduce an important branch of the law to the form
of a connected system of intelligible rules and principles."
To this reply may be made that if any such work could be
completely successful., Mr. Justice STEPHEN'S Digest would
be. But a most thorough test of that truly wonderful book,
made within the writer's own observation, has demonstrated that a student who has thoroughly mastered its
clear and concise statement of principles is, nevertheless,
incapable of applying them successfully to the solution of
a case stated, unless he has studied-not merely syllabusexamples, like those which Mr. Justice STEPHEN appends
to his text-not merely "illustrative cases," like those
which Mr. RICHARDS prints-but the very cases, in their
chronological order, from which, as from a fons stlendidior vitro, Mr. Justice STEPHEN has deduced the principles
themselves.
But, after all, even if such a criticism has validity, it
amounts to nothing but this-that " Richards on Insurance" is not a perfect book, because it does not possess all
the advantages of every conceivable method of teaching
law and avoid all the disadvantages of those methods. The
fact is, as a most thorough examination has convinced us,
that the book is a careful and scholarly presentation of the
subject. It is clear and concise, and even the more abstruse questions discussed are treated in such away that they
will be readily understood by the merest tyro. It is to be
regretted that the work is not provided with an index.
The table of contents, though full, does not take its place,
and the value of the treatise as a book of reference is someG. w. P.
what impaired by the omission.

